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WORKING PAPER 
 
Introduction.  
Essentially thought for and through the economics prism, the spectacular trade liberalisation 
of globalisation has nonetheless had a fundamental impact on the social organisation of 
States1. This impact is mostly perceived - at least in Northern countries - as essentially 
negative. Globalisation is the cause of a true downward spiral in the field of social rights; it 
allows for competition to exist between national social systems through the collapse of 
economic borders, enabling operators to organise production chains beyond borders and thus 
exerting a strong pressure on labour costs. This effect is even more vigorous as labour law 
rules, and, more broadly, the organisation of labour markets, have remained strictly national. 
The contrast between the internationalisation of capital and the strict maintenance of labour 
frameworks within national boundaries is striking. 
Of course, such a situation has led to counter-reactions, the first of which are institutional. In 
this respect, the most accomplished structure is the European Union. By the twofold way of 
coordination and harmonisation, the EU is attempting to fulfil the mission it has set for itself: 
to become a "social market economy", aiming at “full employment and social progress 
"(Article 3 TEU). Its achievements are certainly not inconsiderable. However, they remain 
largely insufficient to counterbalance the strong asymmetry that continues to reign between 
economic and social concerns. The same could be said regarding other institutional initiatives, 
global like the ILO or regional such as NAFTA, whose social role, although not insignificant, 
is not likely to be an effective counterweight either2.  
Other responses involve the development of new standards for protagonists themselves, 
independently of any institutional framework. In this respect, the development of corporate 
social responsibility, no matter how slow and difficult, is undeniably a major step forward3. 
By developing standards that aim to overcome the double compartmentalisation of legal 
personalities and legal orders, corporate social responsibility is undoubtedly a path to the 
development of adapted social standards in the globalised context which is now that of 
corporations. In addition, the gradually increasing share of international framework 
                                                             
1 On the whole, see M.-A. MOREAU, Normes sociales, droit du travail et mondialisation, Paris, Dalloz, 2006. 
2 On the ILO and its progressive marginalisation, even though the original project aimed at the reconstruction 
of a global economic system in which labour would have its place, see A. Supiot, L’esprit de Philadelphie, Seuil 
2010. 
3 For a recent synthesis, see R. de Quénaudon et K. Martin-Chenut (dir.), La RSE saisie par le droit – Perspectives 
internes et internationales, Pedone, 2016. 
agreements in this context, albeit still relatively modest, shows that the path of a transnational 
social dialogue, even if narrow, is not completely closed4. 
Mixing institutional considerations and specific norms intended for protagonists, the 
development of fundamental labour rights is also part of the response to a globalisation that 
cannot be solely economic. The abundance of standards in this area is spectacular5. It is well 
known that the International Labour Organisation, ever since the 1998 Declaration, has 
largely steered its action in favour of the development of these specific standards6. At the 
regional level, the 1994 North American Agreement on Labour (NAALC) complements the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and lays down a number of fundamental 
rights inspired by the ILO Declaration, while expanding those rights already proclaimed7. For 
its part, the constitutive agreement of Mercosur is completed by a Social Declaration of 
19988. The effectiveness of these agreements remains disputed, but they do establish the 
reality of the progressive propagation of fundamental social rights. 
But it is in Europe especially that fundamental social rights are diffused most effectively, 
through two essential instruments: the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
and the European Social Charter. The first is distinctive for its substantial social chapter, 
likely to have a major influence on the EU as a whole9. The second has been adopted by the 
Council of Europe and is exclusively devoted to social issues. Far less famous than the 
European Convention on Human Rights, the European Social Charter has nonetheless 
gradually acquired a certain importance, to the point that we can now attempt to see it as a 
real "social constitution for Europe "10.  
These last two texts are distinctive in that they are backed by an institutional dispute 
settlement system: the Court of Justice of the European Union in the first case, and the 
European Committee of Social Rights in the other.  
This myriad of fundamental norms and jurisdictional and para-jurisdictional forums inevitably 
generates confusion. However, it also testifies to the gradual emergence of new modes of 
dispute resolution, still largely under construction, compelling new methods of articulation of 
legal standards and legal orders. 
The July 3d 2013 decision of the European Committee of Social Rights is emblematic in this 
respect11. Taken by an authority whose fame and legitimacy are still largely to be established, 
                                                             
4 A. van Hoek et F. Hendrickx, « International private law aspects and dispute settlement related to 
transnational company agreements », 20 october 2009, available on : 
ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=4815&langId=en (last accessed 10 Decembre 2017). 
5 On the whole, see I. Daugareilh (dir.), Mondialisation, Travail et Droits Fondamentaux, Bruxelles-Paris, 
Bruylant-LGDJ, 2005 
6 F. Maupain, « L’OIT, la justice sociale et la mondialisation », Rec. Cours, 1999. Vol. 278, p. 201. 
7 L. Compa, « L’ALENA et les droits fondamentaux des travailleurs des pays partenaires », in : I. Daugareilh, 
Mondialisation, travail et droits fondamentaux, supra, p. 83. 
8 G. von Potobsky, « La déclaration sociale du Mercosur », in : I. Daugareilh, Mondialisation, travail et droits 
fondamentaux, précité, p. 99.  
9 L. He, Droits sociaux fondamentaux et droit de l’Union européenne, Typed thesis, Paris 1, 2017. 
10 O. de Schutter, La Charte sociale européenne : une constitution sociale pour l'Europe, Burylant, 2010. 
11 CEDS, 3 juillet 2013, Confédération générale du travail de Suède (LO) et Confédération générale des cadres, 
fonctionnaires et employés (TCO) c. Suède, n°85/2012. On this decision, see, in French, K. Chatzilaou, « La 
réponse du Comité européen des droits sociaux aux arrêts Viking et Laval », RDT. 2014. 160 and N. Moizard, 
devoid of the binding authority of a real international judicial decision and adopted in 
response to another decision which illustrated the limits of the fundamental rights of workers 
in a global economic context, the LO and TCO v. Sweden case is a most vivid illustration of 
the practical difficulties in protecting workers in a globalized world. 
Let us be the judges of that.  
 
From the Laval case to the lex Laval  
The remote starting point of this procedure is the famous Laval judgment of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union12. This decision is specific to the EU, in that it can only be 
understood within the tightly woven network of economic liberties peculiar to the 
construction of Europe. In this sense, it does not concern the global labour market this chapter 
is about. It is nonetheless a particularly striking occurrence of the difficulties that market 
raises, even if this is only a local context. The mobility of labour is indeed at stake here, as 
well as the difficult confrontation between an economic sphere that bypasses borders and a 
social sphere firmly rooted within them.    
The response of the Court of Justice to the refusal of a Latvian employer who had posted 
workers to a construction site to accept a Swedish collective agreement and to the subsequent 
blockade of the construction site is well known. The Court of Justice found that the employer 
was a victim of excessive interference with the freedom of movement. It considered, in its 
usual course of reasoning, that an obstacle to free movement of services was indeed 
established; that it could admittedly be justified by a fundamental right to collective action, 
which it sanctioned in passing; but that such justification entailed that a requirement of 
proportionality be met, which it was not in this case. The posting directive was of no 
assistance13: being a collective agreement that was not extended, but applicable only to its 
signatories, it could not benefit from the mandatory application mechanism provided for by 
the directive. 
This summary does not do justice to the nuances and complexity of the case, but it shows how 
its stakes resided in the frontal shock between the liberalisation of trade – here free movement 
of services – and its social consequences. Most importantly, it explains that following this 
decision, Sweden adopted a law, significantly called the "lex Laval", whose purpose was 
precisely to restrict collective actions of employees aimed at the conclusion of collective 
agreements.  
In practice, this law doubly limited the right to collective action against a company employing 
posted workers. Firstly, actions could only take place in a number of areas, essentially 
corresponding to the field of the posting directive; secondly, actions could have no other 
purpose than to require the employer to comply with minimum requirements, in particular 
with regards to remuneration, to the exclusion of more demanding claims. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
« Le droit d’action collective en droit de l’Union après la décision LO et TCO c. Suède du Comité européen des 
droits sociaux », RTDH, 2015, p. 603. 
12 CJCE, Laval, aff. C-341/05 du 18 décembre 2007. Sur cette décision, v. dans le présent ouvrage l’analyse 
approfondie d’U. Grusic, « The Laval Case », infra/Supra, p. XXX.  
13 Directive 96/71 of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of 
services, OJEC, n° L. 18 of 21 January 1997, p. 1. 
The law thus constituted a restriction to the freedom of collective action of employees, which 
is yet undeniably a fundamental right. This is evident in the European Union: beyond the 
Laval case, the Charter of rights makes the right to collective action a fundamental right. In 
fact, the charter explicitly recognizes the right of workers "in cases of conflicts of interest, to 
take collective action to defend their interests, including strike action" (Article 28). 
But it is not alone in this. This right to collective action is also enshrined in other fundamental 
rights instruments, notably in the European Social Charter, which sanctions in Article 6§4 
“the right of workers and employers to collective action in cases of conflicts of interest, 
including the right to strike” 14.  
It is on the basis of this charter that the Swedish lex Laval was challenged.  
 
The Response of the European Committee of Social Rights 
The European Social Charter includes a para-jurisdictional mechanism, in the form of an 
appeal to an expert panel, the European Committee of Social Rights. Its decisions have 
neither the binding force nor (for now) the prestige of the decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights or, a fortiori, of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Nevertheless, they 
are an essential source for the interpretation of fundamental social rights. 
Having activated the collective redress mechanism provided for in the Charter, some Swedish 
unions challenged the lex Laval’s compliance with the Charter and, in particular, with Article 
6§4. The Committee ruled in favour of the trade unions, in interesting terms that highlight the 
difficulties that may, in the future, characterize relations between the European Union and the 
Council of Europe in the social field. Three points are significant. The first two relate to the 
European Union in general, the third to the non-conformity of the national law with the 
Charter. 
The first point is about the absence of a presumption of conformity of EU law with the 
Charter. It is well known that the European Court of Human Rights held in the famous 
Bosphorus case15 that the compatibility of European legislation with the European Convention 
on Human Rights could be presumed. Taking note of the still minor place given to 
fundamental social rights in the Union, the Committee adopts here the opposite position, in 
stinging terms worthy of attention. It considers that (Nb. 74): 
 “Neither the current status of social rights in the EU legal order nor the substance of EU 
legislation and the process by which it is generated would justify a general presumption of 
conformity of legal acts and rules of the EU with the European Social Charter”.  
Although the Committee also declares itself ready to change its position were the situation to 
evolve, it could hardly be clearer about the relative circumspection, if not suspicion, with 
which it contemplates EU law in social matters. 
This is mostly due to the subordination in the EU legal order of social concerns to economic 
ones, which is the second point. The Committee here takes the exact opposite stance to the 
                                                             
14 For a more systematic analysis of article 6, see part. F. Dorssemont, « Article 6: The Right to Bargain 
Collectively: A Matrix for Industrial Relations », in : N. Bruun et al., The European Social Charter and 
Employment Relation, Hart Publ., 2017.  
15 CEDH, 30 June 2005, Bosphorus Airlines c. Irlande, req. n° 45036/98  
Court of Justice’s in the Laval case. The latter, bound by its precedents and the mighty legal 
construction of the freedom of movement, started from the principle of freedom of movement 
to then assess whether an obstacle to it could be justified. In doing so, the Court prioritized 
economic requirements (freedom of movement) over social requirements (protection of 
fundamental rights of workers) by instituting a relationship of principle to exception. Yet this 
was not logically necessary, as the Committee decision very clearly shows. In fact, if one 
started reasoning from fundamental social law instead of freedom of movement, the reasoning 
would reverse. Thus, as stated by the Committee at number 121: 
“Legal rules relating to the exercise of economic freedoms established by State Parties either 
directly through national law or indirectly through EU law should be interpreted in such a way 
as to not impose disproportionate restrictions upon the exercise of labour rights as set forth 
by, further to the Charter, national laws, EU law, and other international binding standards.” 
The burden of proof reverses: it is for freedom of movement to not disproportionately affect 
the initial principle of workers' rights. The contradiction between these two reasonings is, of 
course, explained by the source of the interpreted norm: the EC Treaty in one case, the 
European Social Charter in the other. In this sense, this contradiction also illustrates the 
theory of constraints, which shows how much interpretation of the law is indissolubly linked 
to the configuration of legal systems and to the way protagonists think of it16. Nevertheless, 
by proposing the exactly opposite analysis, the European Committee of Social Rights offers 
argumentative resources to construct an alternative analysis to that of the Court, which can 
now apply to the EU system. Beyond the failed attempt of the Monti II proposal, which 
sought to establish equal treatment of freedom of movement and the right to collective 
action17, the integration of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in primary law has 
enshrined a strict legal equality between fundamental rights and freedom of movement. 
Nothing but the historical precedence of the freedom of movement now imposes the hierarchy 
sanctioned in the Laval case. The European Committee of Social Rights here proposes an 
alternative route which could easily be taken by the Union. 
The third point tackles the substance of the law. The condemnation of the Swedish law is 
final. After recalling the importance of the rights to collective bargaining and to collective 
action (Nb. 109), the Committee notes that “this statutory framework imposes substantial 
limitations on the ability of Swedish trade unions to make use of collective action in 
establishing binding collective agreements on other matters and/or to reach agreements at a 
higher level” (Nb. 112). It is therefore constitutive of a "disproportionate restriction on the 
free enjoyment of the right of trade unions to engage in collective action” (Nb. 123). 
The opposition is thus total and the Swedish law, drafted as a simple application of the Laval 
jurisprudence and of the posting directive, is irrevocably condemned.  
                                                             
16 M. Troper, V. Champeil-Desplats, C. Grzegorczyk (dir.), Théorie des contraintes juridiques, LGDJ, Paris, 2005. 
17 European Commission, Proposal for a council regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action 
within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services, of 21.3.2012, 
COM(2012) 130 final. 
One should be under no illusions about the immediate effectiveness of this ruling. If the lex 
Laval was indeed eventually repealed, it was only in April 2017, as the result of political 
changeover and not out of willingness to comply with the committee 18.  
The fact remains, however, that the discussion in front of the European Committee of Social 
Rights clearly showcased a possible alternative discourse to a narrative that is all too often 
seen as reasonable or logically necessary. There is no logical necessity in the position of the 
Court of Justice, only a vision of the hierarchy of norms that can evolve.  
The LO and TCO v. Sweden ruling, further than an isolated decision, should be viewed within 
a more general debate on the evolution of the articulation of standards in Europe and beyond, 
and on the emergence of a global jurisprudence of fundamental rights.  
 
Articulating standards 
The Laval debate arose out of a very technical issue: the posting of salaried workers, which is 
itself part of the larger debate on the law applicable to employment contracts in international 
situations.  
In general, the model of labour mobility that underlies the conflict of law rules in labour law 
(Regulation 593/2008, Rome 1) is that of the long-term (if not definitive) integration of the 
worker in their host community. It is labour immigration that is first at issue. Such integration 
implies the application of the law of the place of performance of work, which will determine 
both the legal regime of the employment contract and, in the field of social security 
(Regulation 883/2004), that of social benefits. The innumerable advantages to the application 
of that law are well established. The fundamental requirements of a State’s social cohesion 
entail that labour rules of that State be applicable to all workers in that territory and explain 
that these rules are very frequently mandatory. The predominance of the State of performance 
of work therefore justifies the applicability of its rules, in terms of labour law and of social 
protection. 
But this scheduling gets blurred when employees are intrinsically mobile and thus have 
connections with several states. Workers employed in international transports, for instance, or, 
above all, posted workers, are attached to several legal orders at once, all of which, one way 
or another, may have an interest in imposing the application of their own rules. In the context 
of freedom of movement, this question fits within the issue of the competition between social 
systems, allowed by the encouragement of labour mobility, which causes concerns, as 
showcased in France with the irruption into public debate of the alien and nauseating figure of 
the Polish plumber. 
The international private law question at stake remains fairly standard: it consists, in the face 
of a legal situation extending over different locations, in weighing the various connecting 
factors to find the most relevant one in order to designate the applicable law. But the relative 
neutrality of this technique is insufficient. The answer must consider both the substantial 
objectives of the European Union – ensuring free movement of workers - and the social 
concerns of States. Beyond the localisation process itself, the difficulty is to find an 
                                                             
18 Danielsson, Michaela, Gustafsson, Anna-Karin, « Sweden : the repeal of Lex Laval », Eurowork, 14 July 2017, 
available at : https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/sweden-the-repeal-of-lex-
laval.  
equilibrium between opposing impulses: of the EU to enforce the free movement 
requirements, of States to uphold the fundamental principles of their social systems, and of 
individuals to benefit from the most advantageous rules. The extreme difficulty of reconciling 
these interests explains the great doctrinal attention paid to the question of the posting of 
salaried workers. 
The search for this equilibrium led to the adoption of Directive 96/71 which, after decisions of 
the Court of Justice to that effect, enabled the host State to compel application of its laws as 
mandatory provisions in several specific cases, instead of the normally applicable law of the 
place of habitual performance19. The 1996 directive has had the practical advantage of putting 
an end to a major debate on the possibility of imposing application of the host State’s rules, 
when in principle the home State laws applied; by providing a list of the specific cases 
concerned, it also put an end to a vast theoretical debate on the identification of these 
mandatory provisions.  
But this answer was insufficient, as the Laval case showed. Beyond the applicability of 
collective agreements, which were at issue in the case, the real question was about the respect 
of the fundamental requirements of the host Stat’s social relations system. The peculiarity of 
conventional labour relations in Sweden and the existence of a proactive model, alternative to 
the legicentric model at the heart of the 1996 directive, showed how inadequate this approach 
was. The question is not so much that of the mandatory provisions but whether to allow the 
social institutions of the host State to play the role which is theirs. In this respect, strictly 
regulating the possibility for trade unions to take collective action to improve working 
conditions, as required by the Laval case and the lex Laval, was a clear illustration of the 
pernicious influence on social systems of a too abruptly designed model of articulation of 
norms. More broadly, the debate showed how much the question is not merely the difficulty 
of the articulation of norms. There are, beyond coordination, substantial aims to preserve.  
The European Union is now moving forward in this direction. The European Commission’s 
proposal for the revision of the posting directive made on 8 March 201620 aims precisely to 
question the logic of pure articulation of standards, by introducing substantive considerations 
relating to equal treatment, particularly regarding remuneration. This solution goes directly 
against the lex Laval, which in terms of posted workers prohibited unions from claiming 
anything other than minimum wage through collective action. 
The use of modes of articulation based on the reality of social relations in the country in 
question, not on an abstract view of the conflict rule, is a model to monitor closely. There is 
here, in our view, a more general sense of the evolution  of private international labour law, 
by the progressive integration of substantive considerations into conflict of law rules.  
 
A global case law of fundamental rights?  
                                                             
19 Article 8§2 of the Rome 2 Regulation, which designates the law of the place of performance as applicable to 
the employment contract, adds that “The country where the work is habitually carried out shall not be deemed 
to have changed if he is temporarily employed in another country”. 
20 Proposal for a directive amending Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 
December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, COM(2016) 
128 final ; proposal then discussed within the Council (General Orientation 24 October 2017,  13612/17), then 
Parliament (Draft legislative Resolution of Parliament of 19 October 2017 (2016/0070(COD))  
The decisions of the Court of Justice and of the European Committee of Social Rights are 
mostly about the legal order of the European Union. They can only be understood within the 
framework of the enshrinement of the freedoms of movement and, more broadly, of the 
economic integration specific to the European structure. In this respect, these decisions are but 
a milestone in a broader discussion that has gained momentum in the context of the economic 
crisis that has been rattling Europe since 2008. 
The austerity measures implemented in many countries have led to such social regressions 
that they inevitably offend fundamental rights. In this respect, there is again a striking contrast 
between the Court of Justice and the European Committee of Social Rights. 
The former sheltered behind the competence argument to justify extremely cautious – if not 
cowardly - solutions, which did not fail to disappoint. Several judgments held that 
determination between austerity measures and the protection of social rights was not within 
the scope of EU law21. This general statement is hardly convincing, especially as regards the 
Charter. The Court was not in any way asked to comment on the principle or the nature of the 
austerity measures themselves, but rather to compare some of their social provisions with the 
Charter. Those consequences undeniably fall within the scope of application of EU law, by 
virtue of Article 153 TFEU and extensive related secondary law. The competence argument, 
therefore, seems barely convincing22. 
The solution must, above all, be contrasted with the audacity of the European Committee of 
Social Rights, which ruled that the austerity measures imposed on Greece were contrary to the 
requirements of the Charter23. The particularly strong words of the Committee, deeming that 
the economic crisis could not justify the violation of fundamental social rights, are a striking 
contrast to the cautious technicality of the Court of Justice. 
The generality of the Committee's words makes it possible to go beyond the European 
framework alone. The condemnation of the subordination of fundamental social rights 
requirements and the strong reaffirmation of their primacy, including against central 
economic freedoms, are part of the broader framework of development of international 
standards on fundamental social rights and arenas in which to invoke them. The multiplication 
of fundamental social rights has gradually led to the emergence of new para-jurisdictional 
actors, who will perhaps play their full role tomorrow. The OECD, the ILO and the Council of 
Europe are all opening today, with varying success, collective redress mechanisms allowing 
                                                             
21 v. CJUE, 27 décembre 2012, aff. C-370/12, Pringle ; more specifically on fundamental social rights see the 
cases relating to Portugal : ECJ, 7 march 2013, aff. C-128/12, Sindicato dos Bancarios do Norte ; ECJ, 26 june 
2014, aff. C- 264/12 Sindicato Nacional dos Profissionais de Seguros e Afins ; ECJ, 21 october 2014, C-665/13, 
Sindicato Nacional dos Profissionais de Seguros e Afins. 
22 F. Martucci, « La Cour de justice face à la politique économique et monétaire : du droit avant toute chose, du 
droit pour seule chose », RTDE. 2013. 267. 
23 ECSR, 23 May 2012, Fédération générale des employés des compagnies publiques d’électricité (GENOP-DEI) et 
Confédération des syndicats des fonctionnaires publics (ADEDY) c. Grèce, n° 65/2011 et n° 66/2011). On these 
decisions, see part. J.-P. Marguénaud et J. Mouly, « Le comité européen des droits sociaux face au principe de 
non-régression en temps de crise économique », Droit social, 2013, p. 339 ; C. Deliyanni-Dimitrakou, « La 
Charte sociale européenne et les mesures d’austérité grecques : à propos des décisions nos 65 et 66/2012 du 
Comité européen des droits sociaux fondamentaux », Rev. Dr. Trav 2013, p. 457. 
protagonists themselves, and in particular the unions, to challenge national rules and 
practices24. 
In this respect, the "case law" of the European Committee of Social Rights contributes to the 
creation of a "global case law of fundamental rights" in the sense of a process generating a 
stock of potential solutions, rendered in deterritorialised frameworks, and from which national 
or international judges could draw25. 
This gradual affirmation of fundamental human rights in labour thus shows that the creation 
of a global labour market does not inevitably lead to a weakening of the protection of 
workers. The path will of course be very long, but it is certainly one worth taking. This is also 
one of the lessons of the LO and TCO v. Sweden decision.  
                                                             
24 I. Daugareilh, « Les modes de règlement para juridictionnels des différends relatives aux droits sociaux dans 
les organisations internationales », in : M.A. Moreau et al. (dir.), Justice et mondialisation, Dalloz, 2010, p. 235. 
25 E. CARPANO, « Réflexions sur l’idée d’une jurisprudence globale des droits fondamentaux », in Mélanges en 
l’honneur du Professeur Dominique Turpin, Etat du droit, état des droits, L.G.D.J, 2017, p.507. 
